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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
P. MART JOR'GENSEN and 
MARIE A. JORGENSEN, his 
wife, dba DIMPLE DELL 
FLORAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 9602 
vs. 
HARTFO·RD FIRE INSURANCE 
CO:MPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant ,and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff upon an insur-
ance policy issued by defendant covering all direct 
loss by fire. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found 
that a fire occurred on the premises of the defendant, 
and as a direct loss of the fire, plaintiffs suffered 
damage in excess of $5,000.00, and judgment was 
entered against defendant under the terms of its 
policy of insurance with plaintiffs for the sum of 
$5,478.38. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of 
the trial ·court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action will be referred to 
as they appeared in the trial court. 
The plaintiffs operate a floral business known 
as Dimple Dell Floral where they grow potted 
plants, chrysanthemums, poinsettias, azaleas, and 
other varietie·s of green plants ( R. 9) . 
In connection with that operation they pur-
chased a policy of insurance from the defendant, 
identified at trial as Exhibit 1. The policy insured 
against: 
. 
" ... ALL DIRECT LOSS BY FIRE, 
LIGHTNING AND BY RE'MOVAL FROM 
PREMISES ENDANGERED BY THE PER-
ILS INSURED A G A I N S T IN THIS 
POLICY ... " 
Under paragraph 14 of the policy, the follow-
1ng appears : 
"Electrical Apparatus: If electrical ap-
pliances or devices (including wiring) are 
covered under this policy, this company shall 
not be liable for any electrical injury or dis-
turbance to the said electrical appliances or 
devices (including wiring) caused by elec-
trical currents artificially ge11erated unless 
fire ensues, and if fire does ensue, this com-
pany shall be liable only for its proportion 
of lo'ss caused by such ensuing fire." 
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The plants and bulbs in the greenhouse were 
insured for $5,000.00 under the terms of the policy, 
as set forth above. 
The plaintiffs' greenhouse is heated by steam 
heat and fired by an oil furnace. During the winter 
months, the grennhouse night temperature is main-
tained at approximately 65 degrees ( R. 10) . An 
electrical alarm is so constructed that when the 
temperature in the greenhouse drops to 53 degrees 
Farenhei t, it sounds an alarm in the bedroom of 
the plaintiffs, which is approximately 100 feet away 
from the greenhouse ( R. 10) . During the evening 
of the 12th of December, 1960, and the morning 
of the 13th of December, 1960, the alarm sounded. 
Mr. Jorgensen immediately went to the greenhouse 
and found th·at the furnace was not operating (R. 
11). 
When Mr. Jorgensen first entered the green-
house after the alarm sounded, he recognized the 
smell of an over-heated motor ( R. 22). He observed 
no damage ( R. 23), and saw no smoke ( R. 21). 
His attempts to reset the controls and start the 
furnace were futile and he immediately called his 
neighbor Darrell Maynes, who is an electrician 
(R. 11). 
Since the temperature in the greenhouse was 
falling, the plaintiff burned alcohol an·d fuel in 
small stoves which produced sufficient heat (R. 12) 
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to maintain the temperature in the greenhouse above 
freezing for approximately 25 hours while repairs 
to the motor and furn~ace were being completed 
(R. 12-13). During this time, plaintiff's plants 
were damaged. The poinsettas turned blue and lost 
their leaves "and everything got covered with 
smoke," from the improvised heaters ( R. 13). Ex-
hibit No. 3 is a list of plants allegedly damaged. 
Some of the plants were salvaged and sold at a dis-
count (R. 14). 
Mr. Maynes discovered that the electric motor 
would not operate because it was "electrically burn-
ed out" (R. 35). He found some charred insulation 
in the area where the copper wire had melted. The 
plaintiffs maintained ·a new standby motor which 
the electrician installed and it immediately "burned 
out" (R. 24, 39). The electric motor which faile!d 
served to pump oil into the furnace and also operated 
a blower constructed as a part of the furnace ( R. 
26). 
The plaintiffs' electrician explained that the 
excessive heat in a motor is caused "by electrical 
disturbances of some sort or another" ( R. 40). He 
testified: "if the motor stops ·and the electrical cur-
rent remains attached, that will cause it; another, 
there are two sets of windings in there. One is de-
signed to carry a heavy current for a short period 
of time, but if it remains in or falls back into con-
tact, that will do it" (R. 41). 
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Mr. Maynes originally installed the motor pro-
tection and control units, in connection with the 
operation of the furnace. They consisted of a mag-
netic switch with thermo-over-load protection units 
anld m·an ual switch operations ( R. 42) . After the 
second motor "burned out" the entire motor and a 
part of the furnace, were removed for repair ( R. 45). 
Mr. Eugene Hadley, an electrician employed by 
the C. W. Silver Company, was ·also called to J orgen-
sen's place of business during the early hours of 
December 13, 1960. When he arrived, he examined 
the motor and found it was '"blowed" ( R. 47). He 
explained this term by saying: ''In the process the 
wires in the motor melted and the circuits broke." 
Since the melting point of copper is 1981 degrees 
Farenheit (R. 48), he gave as his opinion that 
when the copper wiring was in the process of melt-
ing it would prdduce a "glow" ( R. 48). He explained 
that the melting of the wire circuits in the motor 
took place after the motor had stopped ( R. 49). He 
described the "glow" as the "same glow as in a light 
globe produced from the flow of electricity through 
a wire." On cross examination this witness testified: 
"Q. Did you find what caused this mo-
tor to burn? 
A. It was a bad bearing deep in the 
rotor shaft. 
Q. It was a mechanical defect tha;t was 
in the motor that caused it to electrically burn 
out? 
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A. That is right. ( R. 50) " 
Upon examination of the motor he found that 
the bearings had been severely worn. 
Q. What causes those to wear, do you 
know? 
A. Every day use, metal, weak metal. 
Q. Every day wear and tear? Do you 
know what happened to the second motor? 
A. Well, it was just burned, electrically 
burned is all I know. ( R. 5'1) 
He also gave as his opinion, that the same 
worn bearings which caused the first motor to stop, 
also caused the stoppage of the second motor (R. 
52). Hi's further examination revealed ·a bent shaft 
in the furnace mechanism which, he indicated, would 
not permit the motor to run true and caused an 
electrical overload. 
The defendant called Mr. David Lyon, an elec-
trical engineer, who qu·alified as an expert in his 
profession. He in·dicated that when electrical energy 
is applied to a motor, and it cannot be dissipated 
in form of magnetic energy, th·at it manifests itself 
as heat. "'The insulation become·s charred, and the 
windings eventually short circuit and melt together" 
( R. 58) . He further testified tha:t a defective bear-
ing, or ·any other load connected to a motor which 
restricts the rotation of the motor, heats it ·and slows 
it down. As a result: 
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"The motor is going to become overloaded 
and the speed will fall below its normal, which 
in this case was 3,450 R.P.M. T'he speed falls 
below normal, and therefore the motor begins 
to consume or use or draw in as you m·ay 
choose to look at it, magnetic current. And 
since current is energy, the energy has to be 
dissipated in some form, and as the motor is 
turning slower and slower and therefore ac-
complishing less work, the energy manifests 
itself in the form of heat." (R. 58) 
The heat which is not dissipated causes a rise 
in temperature and "cooks or fuses and blows the 
n1otor, and the motor becomes internally short-cir-
cuited and burned out ... The associated heat in an 
electrical motor failure follows the mechanical mal-
function," (R. 59). 
No testimony was offered by plaintiffs to show 
what portion of the claimed damage to the electric 
n1otors was a result of any alleged fire, and which 
portion was a result of "electrical injury or dis-
turbance.'' 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded 
plaintiffs judgment in the sum of $5,478.38, which 
included $190.20 damage to the furnace and the 
motors ( R. 64-66) . The policy limited recovery to 
$5,0000 (Exhibit 1). 
Motions for New Trial, and to Amend Findings 
of Fact, and Judgment were denied November 21, 
1961. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
P·OINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
A FIRE OCCURRED ON PLAINTIF\FS' PREMISES 
WITHIN THE CONTE1MPLATION OF THE INSUR-
ANCE ·POLICY, WHERE1BY DEFENDANT AGREED 
TO INDE:MNIFY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST ALL 'D'IRECT 
LOSS BY FIRE. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGE WAS A DIRECT AND 
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE A'LLEGED FIRE. 
POINT III. 
RECOVERY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FR·OM 
AN ELECITRI·CAL INJ·URY OR DISTURBANCE IS SPE-
CIFICXLLY EXCUUDED UNDE·R THE TERMS OF THE 
POLICY. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE POLICY 
LIMITS. 
ARGUMENT 
POI'NT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
A FIRE OCCURRED ON PLAINTIFFS' PREMISES 
WITH'IN THE CONTEM1PLATION OF T'HE INSUR-
AN·CE POLICY, WHEREIBY DEFENDANT AGREED 
TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST A·LL D'IRECT 
LOSS BY FIRE. 
·under the terms of the insurance policy the 
defendant insured certain of the plaintiffs' property 
against ". . . all direct loss by fire . . . " 'The inter-
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pretation of this phase presents the principal issues 
of this appeal. Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edi-
tion, p. 783, defines fire as: 
"The effect of combustion. The juridical 
meaning of the word does not differ from the 
vernacular." Lavitt v. Hartford County Mu-
tual Fire Insurance Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 
A. 5'27. 
The cases 'have ·consistently held that the term 
"fire" as used in insurance policies is to be given 
its ordinary and common meaning and not its sci-
entific and technical meaning. Pacific Fire Insur-
ance Company vs. C. C. Anderson Company, 45 Fed. 
Supp. 90 (Idaho), Sculley vs. Brenner County Farm-
ers M~ttual Insurance Ass'n., 245 N.W. 280 (Iowa), 
lr orse vs. The Jersey Plate Glass Ins~tr~ance Com-
pany, 93 N.W. 569 (N.J.) 
The definition of ''fire" as contained in the 
case of L~avitt v. Hartford County Mrzttual Fire In-
surance Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 A. 527, ·has been 
widely accepted by both authors of textual materials 
and legal opinions alike. The Court there stated: 
"The word 'fire', in insuran'ce, does not 
have the technical meaning which is developed 
from a scientific analysis of its nature and 
properties, but more clearly that which con-
forms to the popular understanding of the 
word. It is rather an effect, than an elemen-
tary principle; it is the effect of combustion, 
and is equivalent to ignition or burning; yet 
heat is not 'fire'." (Emphasis added). 
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The annotator in 45 C.J.C., Insurance, Section 
809, page 861 states: 
"As a general rule, to constitute a 'direct 
loss or damage by fire', within the usual 
terms of a policy, there must be an actual fire 
in the proper sense of that term, from which 
the los's or damage results ... " 
In the case of Western Woolen Mill Company 
vs. Northern Assurance Company of London, 139 
Fed. 637 (8th Cir., 1905), a quantity of wool owned 
by plaintiff was insured against direct loss by fire. 
During a flood the wool became submerged in water. 
Followin·g the flooding there was evidence that the 
strings which held the fleeces together had been 
burned and the rooms where the wool was located 
were filled with smoke and an odor of burnt wool. 
A witness testified the wool was so hot it could not 
be handled by hand and there was also some evi-
dence of the existence of ashes. Another testified 
that the wool was ·charred. The trial court sustained 
a demurrer to the evidence and judgment was en-
tered for the defendant. The trial court's finding 
that there was no fire within the meaning of the 
policy was affirmed. The following language, per-
tinent to our present inquiry, is borrowed from that 
. . 
opinion: 
"In their interpretation we n1ust give to 
the words employed therein their ordinary and 
proper significan·ce, unless it appears the par-
ties intended to use them in a different sense. 
10 
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No such intention appears in this case as to 
the use of the word 'fire'. That the wool, sub-
merged for the time mentioned, became smok--
ing hot, may be conceded; that spontaneous 
combustion, caused by the wool being sub-
merged in water, existed may also be conced-
ed; and still the plaintiff has not shown any 
direct loss by fire a's that word is used and 
known to the public generally. Fire is always 
caused by combustion, but combustion does 
not always cause fire. The word 'spontaneous' 
refers to the origin of that combustion. It 
means the internal development of heat with-
out the action ~c)f the external agent. 'Fire' is 
defined in the Century Dictionary as 'the 
visible heat or light evolved by the action of a 
high temperature on certain bodies, which are 
in consequence styled 'inflamable or combus-
tible.' In Webster's Dictionary 'fire' is defined 
as 'the evolution of light and heat in the com-
bustion of bodies.' No definition of fire can be 
found that does not include the idea of visible 
heat or light, and this is also the popular 
meaning given to the word." 
See also Security Insurance Company vs. Choctaw 
Cotton Oil Company, 299 P. 882, (Okla. 1931). 
The court properly refused to accept mere evi-
dence of charring and ashes, which were plain in-
dications of combustion and heat as the equivalent 
of fire. 
This common sense meaning of "fire" within 
the contemplation of fire policies, has been adopted 
by those courts which have considered claims of 
11 
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coverage under a fire policy where the only evi-
dence of "fire" was an overheated electric motor. 
In the case of Saul J. B~aron Corp. vs. Piedmont 
Fire Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.S. 2d 713, 166 Misc. 69 (1937), 
the plaintiff brought an action in the New York 
Court under a standard fire policy for damage re-
sulting from an alleged fire. The defendant denied 
the existance of a fire. In a Per Curiam decision 
the ·court held: 
"Plaintiff had the burden of showing its 
alleged fire damage. The only evidence of the 
cause of the alleged fire, charring, or burning 
of electric wiring, was that of an overload of 
electric current. The burning or charring of 
a wire carrying electric current occurring 
during or accompanying an overload of cur-
rent, must be regarded as an electrical injury, 
e'specially when, as here, there is an absence 
of evidence showing such burning or charring 
to be a fire, as distinguished, if it can be that, 
from electrical injury." 
The judgment warding recovery was reversed. 
The same result was reached by the Pennsyl-
vania Court in the case of Bass, et al vs. Security 
Insur~ance Company of N ezv Haven, et al., 78 D. & 
C. 26, (Pa. 1951). The defendants had issued fire 
insurance policies to the plaintiff wherein property 
of the plaintiff was insured against "direct loss by 
fire". The issuance of the policies and the damage 
were 'admitted, but the defendants denied the Io·ss 
was a result of fire. The evidence indicated that when 
12 
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firemen arrived at the premises they found the 
ground floor and the cellar of the building filled 
with smoke. In the cellar they found an overheated 
and smoldering electric motor. There was no visible 
light or flame. v-r egetables, fruits and meats in the 
premises were condemned by the health authorities, 
and the plaintiff brought suit to recover his loss 
occasioned thereby. The case turned on the meaning 
of "fire" as contained in the policy. The following 
is quoted from the opinion of the court: 
" 'Fire' is a con1mon term. It is a rule 
of reason, primarily in the interpretation and 
construction of written contracts, fuat the 
sense in which the terms are used is deter-
mined by the intent of the parties. The term 
'fire', is not defined in these contracts, and 
hence it is that the commonly understood 
meaning is the criterion." (Citing cases) 
After discussing several decisions from other 
jurisdictions, the Court concluded: 
"There was no fire as such term is used 
in the policies and therefore no liability of 
the insurers arose thereunder." 
The mere presence of heat is to be distinguishe'd 
from "fire" under a fire insurance policy. This dis-
tinction has been long recognized by the courts. The 
Illinois Court, relying on substantial precedent in 
the early case of Gibbons vs. German Insu~ance and 
Savings Instit~ttion, 30 Ill. App. 263, 266 ( 1889), 
held that damage caused by steam escaping from 
13 
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a break in the pipes of the heating apparatus by 
which the rooms were heated, which produced such 
a degree of heat th~at the furniture and books be-
came charred, was not damage by "fire", within the 
terms of an ordinary fire insurance policy. The 
Court stated: 
"The common understanding of the word 
fire would never include heat, short of the de-
gree of ignition, however produced." 
The reasoning contained in the'se early cases 
has found acceptance in the decisions of contempor-
ary courts. In Spare vs. Glen Falls Insurance Com-
pany, 75 A. 64, 137 Conn. 105 (1950), an action 
was filed on a fire policy claiming damage sus-
tained by fire when an oil burning furnace became 
overheated bec·ause of failure of a safety shut-off 
device. The only fire involved was that which burned 
within the combustion chamber of the furnace itself. 
However, the heat be,came so intense as to cause 
the outside finish to "disintegrate". The Court de-
clared the fire, although excessive, to be a friendly 
one and the damage not compensable. 
'''When, however, a friendly fire escapes 
from the agency employed to restrain it, an~d 
damages property by igniting it or, while 
still confined therein, causes a secondary fire 
to Btart outside the agency, it becomes a hos-
tile fire, and for loss 'So cause'd the insurer 
must indemnify the owner. Accordingly, the 
distinction is clearly drawn between a case 
where, as here, damage results in consequence 
14 
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of excessive heat from fire confined as de-
signed, with no external burning, and one 
where such excessive heat kindles a secon·dary 
fire.'' 
A similar result was reached in the case of First 
Christi.an Chnfch vs. Hartford Mutunl Ins. Co., 276 
S.W. 2d 502 (Tenn. 1954), where damage caused 
by heat from an overheated boiler due to a faulty 
stoker mechanism was held not compensable within 
the terms of a fire policy. See also Consoli vs. Com-
monwealth Ins. Co., 84 A. 2d 926 (N. H., 1951), 
to the same effect. 
The testimony of the plaintiff's witness to the 
effect that heat within the electric motor was gen-
erated to a degree sufficient to melt the copper wire 
within the motor and ch·ar the insulation is not 
evidence of a "fire". In the cases cited above there 
was heat produced in the "agency" by a "friendly 
fire" beyond that which was intended or expected, 
but recovery was denied because no damage was done 
beyond the agency itself. There is no evidence, and 
such is not claimed, that the damage to plaintiffs' 
plants resulted from "externallburning", or a "sec-
ondary fire" started outside the agency. 'Thus, even 
were it conceded that the conversion of electric en-
ergy to heat energy under the circumstances of this 
case, was a fire, there would be no basis for recovery 
because it was confined to the motor where its use 
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was contemplated, and burning did not occur be-
yond that '''agency". 
In the instant case the motor became overheated 
be,cause a short circuit, or a resistance which de-
veloped to the electrical current. This same prin-
ciple finds useful application in an electric heating 
coil where heat is produced by creating an inten-
tional resistance to an electric current. U n'der all 
the definitions of "fire", including the Lavitt case, 
the element of '''combustion" is essential. A "fire", 
"frien'dly" or "hostile", was not prolduced within the 
electric motor because there was an absence of com-
bustion. The heat produced from the electrical en-
ergy is not the '''effect of combustion", nor is it 
the equivalent of "ignition or burning." The electrical 
disturbance produced heat, but "heat is not fire". 
There is a further reason why the plaintiff has 
failed to bring his case within the coverage of the 
policy. Electrical current, with accompanying heat 
and light has long been held not to constitute "fire" 
within the meaning of a fire policy. 
In the case of Sleet vs. Farmers Mut1tal Fire 
Ins. Co., 113 S.W. 515 (Ky. 1908), plaintiff's barn 
was struck by lightning and destroyed, but was not 
burned. Tlhe Ken~tucky court in denying the recovery 
under a fire policy, stated: 
"She was not entitled to recover for loss 
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by lightning which did not burn, but merely 
knocked down, the barn, anymore than she 
would have been entitled to recover under 
the policy if it had been blown down by a 
windstorm." 
Similarly, in the instant case the mere existence 
of ·an electrical current with its associated heat and 
light, was not the equivalent of "burning", and was 
not a "fire", within the meaning of the policy. In 
the very eal'ly case of Kenniston vs. The Mer. County 
M~ttual Ins. Co., 14 N. H. Reports 34~ (1843), the 
Court held that damage from lightning without 
combustion was not within the terms of a fire in-
surance policy, although it recognized that h·ad the 
fire occurred from lightning, that the !destruction 
or the damage done would have been compensable. 
In the instant case the electrical malfunction 
could have resulted in a fire and damage, for which 
recovery could have been m·ade. Such did not happen 
and the mere occurrence of an electrical phenomenon 
generating heat is not sufficient to bring it within 
the coverage of the policy. 
Under law and reason it is submitted that an 
electrical short circuit in a motor producing internal 
heat, as was testified to in this case, is not a "fire" 
within the meaning of the insurance policy. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIF'FS' DAMAGE WAS A DIRECT AND 
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE ALLEGED FIRE. 
Even were the trial court justified in finding 
that a fire occurred in the electric motor, the dam-
age which occurred to plaintiff's plants was not the 
direct result thereof. 
"The rule in fire insurance cases where liabil-
ity arises for 'direct' loss is that the loss must 
be connected by the relationship of cause and 
effect with the fire (citing cases). In other 
states, when the subject has received broader 
discussion, 'direct' has been considered the 
equivalent of 'immediate,' or 'approxim'ate', 
as distinguished from 'remote' or incidental." 
Sidehill Corporation vs. Glen Falls Insurance 
Co., 183 No Y. 2d897 (1959). 
The "fire" must be the efficient cause which 
sets in motion the chain of events which immedi-
ately results in the damage. The evidence is undis-
puted in the present case that the motor ceased 
operating because of bad bearings. This fact was 
established by plaintiff's witnesses: 
"It was the mechanical defect that was in the 
motor that caused it to electrically burn out." 
(R. 50) 
Further testimony indicate·d that the worn 
be·arings were a result of "every day wear ·and tear". 
Th·ese bearings caused the motor to become over-
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loaded and reduce its normal speed. As the motor 
turned more slowly, the electrical energy manifested 
itself in the form of heat ( R. 58). The heat asso-
ciated with a n1otor failure followed the mechanical 
malfunction ( R. 59). The uncontradicted testimony 
of the witnesses is that the mechanical failure was 
the proximate and direct cause of the motor failure. 
The facts affirm this fact more convincingly than 
words. Following the "electrical burn-out" of the 
first motor, the electrician installed a second stand-
by motor. It also "burned out" because of the "drag" 
occassioned by the worn bearings. It is submitted 
that if a dozen more electrical motors had been 
successively installed, each would have been "blown 
out" just as the two did because the cause, namely, 
the worn bearings, had not been eliminated. 
The heat generated within the motor, which 
the trial court has termed "fire", did not cause the 
furnace to cease operation and the heat loss in the 
greenhouse. The "fire", if any, was only ·a conse-
quence of the mechanical malfunction, and the re-
sulting "electrical blow-out" of the motors, was not 
a cause, either direct or remote, of the heat failure. 
The "fire" even as alleged by plaintiff occurred after 
the motor stopped, and was in no way a proxim'ate 
cause of the threatened freezing to the plants in the 
greenhouse ( R. 60-61). 
"The proximate cause of the fire within an 
insurance policy is the efficient cause, the one 
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that necessarily sets the other causes in mo-
tion." Port Washington National Bank & 
Trust Company vs. The Hartford Fire Insur-
,ance Compar~y, 300 N. Y. Supp. 87 4, 2·53 App. 
Div. 760. 
The same principle was declared by the Missouri 
court in different language. Where the peril speci-
fically insured against sets other causes in motion, 
which in an unbroken sequence and connection be-
tween the ·act and final injury, produces the final 
results for which the insured seeks recovery under 
the policy, then the peril insured against will be 
regarded as the proximate cause. Dixie Pine Pro-
ducts Company vs. Maryland Casunlty, 100 S. W. 
2d 2'3. 
Mr. Hadley, plaintiffs' witness, affirmed that 
a mechanical malfunction was the cause of the 
damage: 
"Q. Did you find what caused this 
motor to burn? 
A. It was a bad bearing deep in the 
rotor shaft. 
Q. It was a mechanical defect th~at was 
in the motor that caused it to mechanically 
burn out? 
A. That is right." (R. 50). 
It is submitted that the direct or proximate 
cause of plaintiffs' loss was a mechanical failure in 
the motor and furnace mechanism which set in mo-
tion an unbroken sequence of events resulting in his 
damage. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I'll. 
RECOVERY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM 
AN ELECTRICAL INJURY OR DISTURBANCE IS SPE-
CIFICALLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE TERMS ·OF THE 
POLICY. 
The insurance policy, un·der the Farm, Ranch 
and Orchard Endorsement, Paragraph 14, contains 
the following· provisions: 
"14. Electrical Apparatus Clause: If elec-
trical appliances or devices (including wiring) 
are covered under this policy, this company 
shall not be liable for an electrical injury or 
disturbance to the said electrical appliances 
or devices (including wiring) caused 'by elec-
trical currents artificially generated unless 
fire ensues, and if fire does ensue, this com-
pany shall be liable only for its proportion of 
loss caused by such ensuing fire." 
This paragraph specifically excludes coverage 
for any loss or damages resulting from an "elec-
trical injury or disturbance to electrical ... devices 
caused by electrical currents'' unless fire ensues. 
In the event fire does ensue the company has limited 
its liability to the proportion of loss caused by the 
fire. Argument and authority presented under 
Point I, infra., affirms that a "fire" did not ensue. 
Even were it determined that the electrical blow-out 
of the motor was a fire, the company's liability is 
restricted to that portion of the damage directly 
resulting from the fire. No proof was presented or 
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attempted by plaintiff concerning this. Further, 
since "electrical injury or disturbance" is excluded 
from . coverage, any damage proximately resulting 
therefrom is also excluded. 
There is ·a complete absence of evidence in the 
record to show the cost of repair of the damage done 
by ''fire" in the motor. Similarly, there is no evi-
dence whereby the court could find that any fire 
damage resulted. The repair invoice indicates that 
the damages to the motors were mechanical in na-
ture. The repair included rewinding of the motor 
armatures, replacement of bad b e a r i n g s and 
straightening a bent shaft, all as more fully appears 
in plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Electrical exemption clauses 
on fire policies similar to the one contained in the 
policy under consideration have been consistently 
enforced by the courts. See U. S. Fire Insurance 
Company vs. Universal Broadcasting Corporation, 
168 S.W. 2d, 191 (Ark. 1'943). 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE POLICY 
LIMITS. 
The insurance policy, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, in-
dicates that the " ... policy covers the following 
described property ... ''$5,000.00 on plants and bulbs 
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in greenhouse.'' Coverage is specifically limited to 
those items in the amount indicated. 
The judgment entered by the court granted re-
covery for damage to plants and bulbs in the amount 
of $5,000.00, damage to the oil burning unit includ-
ing the motor in the sum of $190.20 and $32.72 for 
purchase of fuel and rental of space heat equipment, 
or a total of $5,222.92, to which interest in the 
amount of $255.46 was added for a total of $5478.38. 
As observed, defendant's liability under the 
policy was limited to $5,000.00. The court permitted 
a recovery of $5222.92, or $222.92 in excess of the 
limits of its li'ability. Applicable interest on the 
excess was also wrongfully included in the judg-
ment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the law and evidence it is submitted 
that: 
1. A "fire" did not occur on plaintiff's pre-
mises as alleged. 
2. Even were it determined that a "fire" did 
ensue, the plaintiffs' damage was not the direct 
result thereof. 
3. Plaintiffs' damage was the direct ,and proxi-
mate result of a mechanical failure which was not 
insured against. 
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4. Any damage resulting from electrical in-
jury, as disturbance w·as specifically excluded from 
coverage under the policy, and 
5. In any event, defendant's liability is lim-
ited to $5,000.00 as stated in the policy. 
The judgment of the trial court should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, & BALDWIN 
an·d MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
BY--------------------------------------------------------
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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